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Abstract 
This research report analyses the effects of ageing populations upon public finances. More 
specifically, it focuses on the implications of population ageing for acute health care, long-term 
care and public pension expenditures for 15 EU countries. It pays particular attention to three 
novel insights: i) a large proportion of health-care spending relates to time to mortality rather 
than to age; ii) life expectancy may increase much faster than current demographic projections 
suggest; and, iii) average health status may continue to improve in the future. It adopts a 
generational accounting model that incorporates health-care costs during the last years of life, 
decomposed into an acute health-care component and a long-term care component. 
The projections show that gains in life expectancy increase age-related expenditure, while 
improved health has the opposite effect. Combined, these trends reduce health-care costs and 
increase pension expenditures. Their joint effect upon public finances is rather modest, 
however. Hence, the assessment of public finances in most EU-15 countries does not change: 
even if a more rapid increase in life expectancy combines with an improvement in health, 
current fiscal and social security institutions will be unsustainable. 
 
Key words: ageing populations, fiscal sustainability 
 
 
                                                      
* Frank Pellikaan and Ed Westerhout both worked at the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis during the time of the project. The authors wish to thank Rudy Douven, Esther Mot and Harry 
ter Rele for their helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts, as well as the participants at the 
AGIR project meetings in The Hague, Helsinki, London, Brussels and Berlin. Thanks are also due to 
Peter Dekker, André Nibbelink and Richard Rosenbrand for their computational assistance. Any 
comments or suggestions can be sent to Ed Westerhout at e.w.m.t.westerhout@cpb.nl.  Contents 
 
Preface...........................................................................................................................................i 
Summary......................................................................................................................................ii 
1.  Introduction..........................................................................................................................1 
2.  Projecting health-care spending.........................................................................................2 
2.1 Standard  projection  method............................................................................................3 
2.2  The mortality-related costs argument.............................................................................4 
2.3  Implications for numerical simulation exercises............................................................5 
3.  Mortality-related costs.........................................................................................................5 
3.1 Methodological  issues ....................................................................................................5 
3.2 Aggregate  age  profiles....................................................................................................7 
3.3  Age profiles of survivors and decedents.........................................................................8 
4.  Living longer.......................................................................................................................12 
4.1  Demographic developments in the EU-15 area............................................................12 
4.2  Assumptions in the base case scenario.........................................................................13 
4.3  Assumptions in the living longerscenario.....................................................................14 
4.4  Projections of acute health- and long-term care expenditures......................................15 
4.4.1  Acute health-care expenditures.........................................................................15 
4.4.2  Long-term care expenditures.............................................................................16 
4.4.3 Health-care  expenditures...................................................................................16 
4.5 Projection  of  public  pension  expenditures....................................................................16 
4.6 Public  finances..............................................................................................................16 
5.  Living in better health.......................................................................................................17 
5.1  Projections of acute health- and long-term care expenditures......................................17 
5.1.1  Acute health-care expenditures.........................................................................17 
5.1.2  Long-term care expenditures.............................................................................18 
5.1.3 Health-care  expenditures...................................................................................18 
5.2 Projection  of  public  pension  expenditures....................................................................18 
5.3 Public  finances..............................................................................................................19 
6.  Living longer in better health ...........................................................................................19 
6.1  Projections of health- and long-term care expenditures ...............................................19 
6.1.1  Acute health-care expenditures.........................................................................20 
6.1.2  Long-term care expenditures.............................................................................20 
6.1.3 Health-care  expenditures...................................................................................20 6.2  Projections of public pension expenditures..................................................................20 
6.3 Public  finances..............................................................................................................20 
7.  Policy options......................................................................................................................22 
7.1  The timing of policy reforms........................................................................................22 
7.2 Tax  policies...................................................................................................................23 
7.3  Expenditure policies in general ....................................................................................23 
7.4  Labour force participation policies...............................................................................24 
7.5 Pension  policies............................................................................................................24 
7.6 Health-care  policies......................................................................................................25 
7.7 Strengthening  the  economy ..........................................................................................25 
7.8 Concluding  remarks......................................................................................................25 
References..................................................................................................................................26 
Appendix A. Data......................................................................................................................29 
Appendix B. The Simulation Model ........................................................................................32 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1  Health-care expenditures by age profile...........................................................................8 
Figure 2  Long-term care expenditures by age profile.....................................................................8 
Figure 3  Mortality-related costs, decomposed into acute health care and long-term care............10 
Figure 4  Acute health-care costs, decomposed into the costs of survivors and decedents, 
in terms of benchmark costs of mortality.......................................................................11 
Figure 5  Long-term care costs, decomposed into the costs of survivors and decedents, 
in terms of benchmark costs of mortality.......................................................................12 
Figure 6  The development of the old-age dependency ratios in the EU.......................................13 
Figure 7  Survival probability of the EU population under different demographic scenarios.......14 
Figure 8  Debt developments – the EU average in four scenarios.................................................21 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1  Division of the costs of mortality by age category over health- and long-term care 
components (%).................................................................................................................11 
Table 2  Change in public expenditures in the living longer scenario.............................................15 
Table 3  Change in public expenditures in the living in better health scenario ...............................18 
Table 4  Change in public expenditures in the living longer in better health scenario....................19 
Table 5  Sustainability gaps in the three scenarios ..........................................................................21 
Table A.1 Remaining life expectancy in good health at ages 15 and 65 (in years)............................30 
 | i 
Preface 
t is quite well known nowadays that ageing populations threaten the sustainability of fiscal 
policies. However, there are questions. Some of them are fundamental. And there are 
uncertainties. These are particularly large due to the long horizons involved. 
This research report analyses the effects of ageing for acute health care, long-term care, public 
pensions and public finances for the countries that belong to the EU-15 area. It pays particular 
attention to three novel insights: i) a large part of health-care spending relates to time to 
mortality rather than to age; ii) life expectancy may increase much faster than current 
demographic projections suggest; and, iii) the average health status may continue to improve in 
the future. It adopts a generational accounting model that incorporates health-care costs during 
the last years of life, decomposed into an acute health-care component and a long-term care 
component. 
The analysis has been carried out as part of the Ageing, Health and Retirement in Europe 
(AGIR) project, Work Package 4, being carried out by the EU-financed European Network of 
Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI). 
An earlier research report on this theme was published as ENEPRI Research Report No. 8, 
Alternative Scenarios for Health, Life Expectancy and Social Expenditure: The Influence of 
Living Longer in Better Health on Health Care and Pension Expenditures and Government 
Finances in the EU by Frank Pellikaan and Ed Westerhout. That report contains more technical 
details about the analysis. This document updates part of the earlier analysis and includes some 
comments on policy implications. 
Thanks are due to Rudy Douven, Peter Kooiman, Esther Mot and Harry ter Rele for their 
helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts. Thanks for comments are also due to the 
participants of various AGIR workshops, a seminar at CPB, the EC/OECD/AWG workshop 
Understanding Trends in Disability among Elderly Populations and the Implications of 
Demographic and Non-Demographic Factors for Future Health and Long-Term Care Costs in 
Brussels on 21-22 February 2005 and the final AGIR conference in Brussels on 10 March 2005, 
and in particular to Axel Börsch-Supan and Bartosz Przywara (the discussants). Thanks are also 
due to Peter Dekker, André Nibbelink and Richard Rosenbrand for computational assistance 
and to Jannie Droog and Annemarie Spaans for typing assistance. The authors acknowledge 
funding from the European Commission under the AGIR project. 
 
Henk Don 
Director, CPB 
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Summary 
t is well known by now that population ageing jeopardises the sustainability of public 
finances in a number of countries. The gradual retiring of the baby-boom generations, low 
fertility rates and ongoing reductions in mortality rates portend dramatic changes in the age 
structure of populations. In many countries, old-age dependency ratios may more or less double 
within a period of 40 years. By themselves, these changes would not be problematic, except for 
the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) nature of many social security institutions. Population ageing 
unbalances the relation between pension expenditures and pension contributions because of its 
PAYG financing mode. This unbalance will be reflected in increasing fiscal deficits, which 
cannot be expected to disappear if policies are left unchanged. 
A number of studies address the problem of quantifying the fiscal impact of population ageing. 
Especially important are the studies by the EU and the OECD, which do so for a large number 
of countries (Economic Policy Committee or EPC, 2001 and Dang et al., 2001, respectively). 
Unfortunately, these studies rely on assumptions that are difficult to accept in the light of recent 
empirical evidence. This also holds true for the assumptions these studies make on mortality-
related costs, the future evolution of mortality rates and the health status of the population. In 
particular, these studies neglect mortality-related costs, assume a slowing down of the process 
of increasing longevity and postulate that the health status of the population will, apart from the 
impact of ageing, remain unchanged. Several arguments call into doubt the usefulness of these 
assumptions. 
Three critical assumptions 
The view that health-care expenditure is a function of age alone is heavily debated nowadays. 
First, evidence abounds that health-care expenditures by people in the last year of their lives is 
substantially larger than those of survivors of the same age. Focusing on the last year of life, the 
costs of decedents can be higher than those of survivors by a factor of 6. The share of 
expenditures during the last year of life of total health-care spending on the elderly is more than 
a quarter. Furthermore, this share is surprisingly stable over time. Calculations that neglect this 
type of evidence produce estimates of expenditure growth that are way too high. The errors 
involved may be 20% or higher. 
Second, many studies take the view that there will be fewer gains in life expectancy because of 
biological limits. The idea that life expectancy gains in the near future will be modest because 
life expectancy is close to a biological limit has some intuitive appeal. Yet it conflicts with more 
recent historical evidence. White (2002) concludes from empirical evidence for a number of 
countries that life expectancy increases by one year every five years. Over the last 40 years, the 
rate of growth in life expectancy has not declined at all; it even shows a slight acceleration. 
Furthermore, Vaupel (1998) presents a number of historical examples in which the reductions in 
mortality rates were highest for the oldest old, contrary to the argument of a biological limit to 
life expectancy, which would suggest smaller life expectancy gains for the older age cohorts. 
Similarly, according to the biological limit argument, one would expect to observe smaller life 
expectancy gains for women, as on average they live longer than men. Nevertheless, Kannisto et 
al. (1994) show that in the 1980s, in contrast to the convergence argument, the gap between the 
mortality rates of women and men did not decrease at all and even grew further. To be sure, 
there is no reason to assume that the future is a mere extrapolation of recent history. But it is 
also true that it is difficult to consider a continuation of historical trends an unlikely scenario. 
A third assumption that may be questioned concerns the health status of the population. Most 
projection exercises that calculate the impact of changing age structures assume constancy of 
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the health status of the population per age group. Historical evidence casts doubt on the validity 
of this assumption, however. Manton et al. (1997), Jacobzone et al. (2000) and Cutler (2001) 
document that disability rates among the elderly have declined and that the health status of 
elderly persons has in general been improving. Even if the more recent trend of worsening 
health as a result of overweight and obesity continues, it is not to be expected that the historical 
trend of improving health will halt within a few years time. 
The future of fiscal deficits and debt positions 
The obvious question arises of what will be the impact of alternative assumptions on these three 
aspects for the future development of budget deficits. Health-care spending may be seriously 
affected – not only the spending on acute health-care services, but also the spending on long-
term care services. Projections for pension expenditure may be importantly altered as well. But 
the projections for labour market participation and thus tax and social security revenues may 
also change on account of alternative assumptions about the health development of the 
population. Ultimately, alternative insights may then change our assessment of the fiscal 
sustainability problem. 
This report explores the impact of alternative assumptions on the determinants of medical 
spending, the development of life expectancy and the development of health. It covers the 
public sector in a broad sense, i.e. it analyses health expenditures, pension expenditures, social 
security expenditures and tax and social security revenues. It makes calculations for the group 
of EU-15 countries. It assesses the impact of life expectancy and health status separately and 
simultaneously, giving rise to three alternative scenarios: ‘living longer’, ‘living in better health’ 
and ‘living longer in better health’. 
Yet a caveat is in order before presenting the results. It would be tempting to interpret the 
calculations as projections of the most likely future developments of important variables. We 
warn against such an interpretation. The reason is that our calculations are kept deliberately 
simple and omit several aspects that are important in real life in order to focus on the 
contribution of the elements of mortality-related costs, life expectancy and health 
improvements. Our study is hopefully able to say something useful on the contribution of these 
three variables but nothing on the contribution of all other variables one can think of that will be 
relevant for fiscal sustainability projections. In order to avoid any misunderstanding we do not 
present the base case scenario but focus on the differences that relate to the trends in 
demography and health. 
Our base case scenario does however reflect some of the things we learned from earlier 
projection exercises. During the next four decades, medical spending on acute health-care 
services and long-term care services will increase, in absolute terms and as a percentage of 
GDP. Pension expenditure will also increase, even faster than medical spending. The increase in 
pension expenditure will peak somewhere around 2035, starting to decline when the baby-boom 
generations gradually pass away. But the increase in health expenditure will continue to reflect 
the ongoing increase in life expectancy. This illustrates once again that population ageing is not 
a temporary issue, which will be resolved once the baby-boom generations have disappeared. 
The combination of an ongoing increase in life expectancy with a fixed age of retirement 
implies a permanent increase in the ratio of retirees to workers. 
We use the sustainability gap to measure the size of the fiscal sustainability problem. To 
understand the sustainability gap, note that population ageing implies a debt that does not show 
up in official statistics. Summing the explicit debt and implicit debt gives the total public debt. 
The sustainability gap is the annuity value of this total public debt figure. We express the 
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sustainability gap in terms of GDP, as is usual for debt figures. Hence, the sustainability gap is 
the immediate and permanent change in the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio required to restore 
fiscal sustainability. 
Why future prospects may be brighter or duller 
In terms of fiscal sustainability, the impact of mortality-related costs is relatively modest. The 
sustainability gap that corresponds to a scenario that does not take into account mortality-related 
costs (and that is identical in all other respects to the base case scenario) is only 0.2 percentage 
points higher than that of the base case scenario. Despite its importance, health-care expenditure 
is only one of the budgetary items affected by population ageing. Pension expenditure, social 
security expenditure and taxes and social security revenues do not change when mortality-
related costs are included in the analysis. Focussing on health-care costs only, the difference is 
about 15%, which is in line with a number of other studies that simulate the impact of mortality-
related costs for the future growth of health-care spending. 
Compared with this, the impact of a stronger increase in life expectancy is much larger. Our 
living longer scenario assumes an increase of eight years, to be compared with a five-year 
increase in the base case scenario. Note that this corresponds more closely with historical 
evidence, which has shown a one-year increase in life expectancy every five years for a number 
of countries. The sustainability gap for the EU-15-average is now 1.0 percentage points of GDP 
larger than in the base case scenario, because the expansion of longevity increases pension and 
health expenditure. It is noteworthy that the reduction in mortality rates, which drives the 
increase in longevity, also reduces health spending in a very direct way, namely by lowering 
mortality-related costs. This effect is so small, however, that it is dominated by the boost in 
health spending resulting from the expansion of longevity. 
The impact of an alternative assumption on the development of health is of similar importance. 
Assuming an improvement of health, the sustainability gap falls by 0.8 percentage points of 
GDP for the average EU-15 country. That the effect of a health improvement is so large has to 
do with its multiple impacts. Better health not only reduces health expenditure, but also delays 
retirement, thereby increasing participation in the labour market and reducing social security 
expenditure. 
Given that the impact of both a stronger increase in life expectancy and a steady improvement in 
the health of the population is relatively large, it is interesting to see the impact on fiscal 
sustainability of the combination of these two trends. This effect turns out to be rather small, 
however: the sustainability gap for the living longer in better health scenario is almost similar to 
that in the base case scenario. The drop in public spending related to healthier lives neutralises 
the boost in public spending on account of longer lives. Yet on a lower aggregate level, the 
combined scenario does not work out to be neutral. Pension expenditure and expenditure on 
long-term care services increase faster than in the base case, whereas acute health-care 
expenditure increases at a slower pace. Moreover, the uncertainties are particularly large in the 
combined scenario. 
A warning signal 
The calculated sustainability gaps deviate significantly from zero and the conclusion that current 
fiscal policies in many EU-15 countries are unsustainable is pretty robust. Obviously, 
exogenous developments may help to make the future look brighter. A substantial increase in 
labour market participation would help to reduce fiscal sustainability problems to a large extent, 
for example. In particular, if the future increase in life expectancy is accompanied by a rise in 
the (actual) retirement age, the extent of fiscal problems will decrease. On the other hand, there CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | v 
 
are adverse risks as well. The prospects of an improvement in the health status of the population 
may fail to materialise and health spending may increase much faster than is assumed in our 
calculations. Indeed, there is ample evidence that economic factors play an important role in 
health expenditure projections and in the assessment of the sustainability of fiscal policies as 
well. Sustainability gaps would then be much higher than those that follow from our 
calculations. Assuming some risk aversion on the part of policy-makers, i.e. that they are more 
concerned with the pessimistic scenarios than the more optimistic ones, this only strengthens the 
case for policy reforms that help to close fiscal sustainability gaps. Which policies should be 
reformed is a question that we cannot answer and clearly falls beyond the scope of our analysis. 
What our analysis offers is only a signal. The signal is that living longer in better health will not 
relieve the fiscal sustainability problems in the EU-15 countries. | 1 
1. Introduction 
As is well known by now, population ageing jeopardises the sustainability of public finances in 
a number of countries. The doubling of old-age dependency ratios (the number of persons aged 
65+ over persons aged 20-64) implies huge public deficits if current fiscal and social security 
institutions are maintained. 
A number of studies address the problem of quantifying the fiscal impact of population ageing. 
Especially important are the studies by the EU and the OECD, which do so for a large number 
of countries (Economic Policy Committee, 2001 and Dang et al., 2001 respectively). Inevitably, 
in order to be able to produce such calculations, assumptions have to be made on things about 
which knowledge is typically scarce. On a few points, however, a case can be made for 
adjusting specific assumptions. Notably, the assumptions that these official projections make on 
the cost of mortality, the future evolution of mortality rates and the health status of the 
population seem difficult to accept on the basis of current empirical evidence. 
First, the view that health-care expenditure is a function of age alone is adhered to by very few 
people nowadays. There is a great deal of evidence that the health-care expenditure of people in 
the last year of their lives is substantially larger than that of survivors of the same age. Focusing 
on the last year of life, the costs of decedents can be six times higher than those of survivors 
(Hogan et al., 2001). The share of expenditures during the last year of life of total health-care 
spending on the elderly is more than a quarter. Furthermore, this share is surprisingly stable 
over time (Lubitz & Riley, 1993 and Hogan et al., 2001). Calculations that neglect this type of 
evidence produce estimates of expenditure growth that are way too high. The errors involved 
may be as large as 20% or more (Westerhout, 2004). 
Second, there is the argument that the gains in life expectancy may become smaller in the 
future, perhaps because of biological limits to human life expectancy. This idea of an upper 
limit to life expectancy was quite popular in the 1960s and 1970s and, indeed, has some 
intuitive appeal (Fogel, 1994). Moreover, it underlies many of today’s projections, including 
those of the EU and the OECD. Nevertheless, it conflicts with more recent historical evidence. 
Life expectancy increases almost linearly over time (Oeppen & Vaupel, 2002). Using data from 
more than 20 countries, White (2002) finds that life expectancy increases by one year every five 
years. Over the last 40 years, the rate of growth in life expectancy has not declined at all; it even 
shows a slight acceleration. This suggests that if there is a biological limit to human life, life 
expectancy is not quite close to this limit or the limit itself evolves over time. 
Furthermore, Vaupel (1998) offers another argument against stabilisation. If the argument of the 
biological limit were true, one would expect to observe smaller life expectancy gains for the age 
cohorts with the shortest life expectancies, i.e. the older age cohorts. Vaupel presents, however, 
a number of historical examples in which the reductions in mortality rates were highest for the 
oldest age cohorts. Similarly, because of the biological limit argument, one would expect to 
observe smaller life expectancy gains for women, as women on average live longer than men. 
Nevertheless, Kannisto et al. (1994) show that in the 1980s, in contrast to this convergence 
argument, the gap between the mortality rates of women and men did not reduce, but instead 
widened further. 
A third issue concerns the health status of the population. Official projections assume that the 
health status of the population, apart from the impact of ageing, will remain unchanged. But 
historical evidence casts doubt on the validity of this assumption. Cutler (2001) and Jacobzone 
et al. (2000) document that disability rates among the elderly have declined in the past, as the 
health status of elderly has in general been improving. More recently, research has become 
available that focuses on the increasing prevalence of overweight and obesity (Sturm, 2002 and 
Finkelstein et al., 2003). If this trend continues, at some point in the future we might see a 2 | WESTERHOUT & PELLIKAAN 
deterioration rather than an improvement of health status (Sturm et al., 2004). Yet it is still 
unlikely that the population will not become healthier during the next decades. 
This report explores the impact of life expectancy and health status for the sustainability of 
public finances. It does so for the EU-15 countries separately and for the EU-15 as a whole. It 
focuses on expenditure for acute health care, long-term care, social security and tax revenues. It 
assesses the impact of life expectancy and health status separately and simultaneously, giving 
rise to three alternative scenarios: ‘living longer’, ‘living in better health’ and ‘living longer in 
better health’. 
Certainly this paper is not the first to focus on the effects of life expectancy and health status. In 
particular, Jacobzone et al. (2000) and Cutler & Sheiner (2001) are important forerunners. 
Compared with these two studies, our research is broader since it also examines the implications 
for pension expenditures and labour market participation. Moreover, the three reports apply to 
different areas. The study by Jacobzone et al. (2000) relates to the OECD area and that by 
Cutler & Sheiner (2001) to the US; our analysis pertains to the EU-15 area. 
Our calculations should not be interpreted as projections of the most likely future developments 
of important variables. The calculations are kept deliberately simple and omit several aspects 
that are important in real life in order to focus on the contribution of mortality-related costs, life 
expectancy and health improvements. This report aims at assessing the implications of only 
three assumptions in the field of demography and health for estimations of the sustainability of 
current fiscal policies. 
An earlier report (Pellikaan & Westerhout, 2005) also discusses our findings, focusing more on 
technical details and presenting a sensitivity analysis. This document updates part of the earlier 
study and includes some comments on policy implications. In particular, the update concerns 
the assumed age profiles of decedents with regard to health-care spending. This update has no 
implications for our results, however, as can be seen by simple comparison.  
The structure of this report is as follows. Section 2 summarises arguments against the standard 
approach for projecting health-care expenditure, which does not take into account mortality-
related costs. Section 3 explains how we include mortality-related costs in our framework. 
Section 4 presents projections of an increase in life expectancy on the development of health 
and pension expenditures and public finances. It pays particular attention to (the relevance of) 
the mortality-related cost argument. Sections 5 and 6 focus upon the effects of health 
improvements and the combination of the two trends. In each case, we calculate the correction 
in primary surpluses that is needed to keep public finances sustainable, the so-called 
‘sustainability gap’. Section 7 is devoted to policy implications. 
2.  Projecting health-care spending  
The demographic structure of populations will change quite dramatically during the next 
decades. Indeed, many industrialised countries will see their populations becoming older. The 
main reasons for this trend are the fall in fertility rates, the gradual retirement of the baby-boom 
generations and the ongoing increase of life expectancies. This process of population ageing 
will have profound effects on the health-care sector and on pension schemes. Furthermore, 
labour market participation is expected to decline. This will have an impact on both tax 
revenues and social security expenditure. Through all these channels, population ageing may 
have a huge impact upon the sustainability of public finances. 
This report critically examines several arguments that underlie this view. In particular, it focuses 
on the relevance of the mortality-related cost argument, i.e. the fact that expenditure increases 
very fast in the last years before mortality, for projections of health expenditure. It thereby CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 3 
 
distinguishes between acute health- and long-term care. In addition, it explores the relevance of 
two additional arguments. The first is that life expectancy may increase in the coming decades 
much more than is recognised by official projections. The second is that the health of the 
population may improve in the coming decades, as it seems to have improved during the last 
ones. To the extent that they are true, these two arguments respectively imply that health 
expenditure may rise at a much faster or slower pace in the future than anticipated thus far. 
Public finances may be affected not only through health expenditure, but also through other 
channels. Indeed, life expectancy will significantly impact pension expenditure. Next, 
improvements in health status will affect labour market participation rates and therefore taxation 
and expenditure on social security. This report carefully calculates the effects on public finances 
through all these channels, with the idea that in the future people may live longer and in better 
health. 
2.1  Standard projection method 
Most simulation studies apply a rather mechanical method to calculate the effect of population 
ageing on public expenditures. This method, which has its roots in generational accounting 
studies, calculates the effect of changes in the age structure of the population under the 
assumption that in the future the age profiles of public expenditure categories will remain 
unchanged. The procedure is as follows. First, current expenditure per age cohort is decomposed 
into the expenditure per capita and the size of that age cohort. Second, expenditure at some 
future date is calculated by multiplying the projected fractions of the population in different age 
cohorts at that date with historical expenditure per capita in these age cohorts, i.e. the 
expenditure per capita in these age cohorts that were calculated in the first step of the procedure. 
The population ageing effect follows from comparing the projected future expenditure with 
current expenditure. 
This analysis adopts this standard extrapolation method when it comes to projecting pension 
expenditure, spending on public goods and tax revenues. In projecting the development of acute 
health-care expenditure and long-term care expenditure, however, it pursues a different strategy. 
Indeed, by distinguishing between survivors and decedents, it allows the age profile of health 
expenditure to change endogenously through time. 
Actually, there are several reasons why the assumption that the age profile of health expenditure 
will remain the same in the future may be wrong. A first reason relates to women giving birth. If 
population ageing is the result of declining fertility rates, one may expect health expenditure to 
be reduced for those ages at which women give birth (Ahn et al., 2004a). A second argument 
pertains to the gender imbalance, i.e. the fact that on average women outlive men. Reductions in 
this gender imbalance – brought about by increases in male life expectancies that outweigh 
increases in female life expectancies – may expand the possibilities of giving care at home, 
thereby diminishing the demand for formal long-term care (Lakdawalla & Philipson, 1999). 
The age profile of medical spending may also shift because of economic growth, medical 
technological progress and health-care sector price inflation. Cutler & Meara (1999) show that 
the age profile of health expenditure by Medicare beneficiaries in the US has grown higher and 
argue that this does not reflect changes in the health status of these people. Instead, they find 
that the disability status of the eldest elderly (85+) is falling more rapidly than that of the 
youngest elderly (65-85). 
Most relevant in this report is that the age profile may also change in case of an improvement in 
the health status of the population or an increase in life expectancy. Indeed, the scenario of 
living in better health reflects an improvement in the health status of the population, which may 4 | WESTERHOUT & PELLIKAAN 
imply a downward shift of the age profile of medical spending. This shift may be parallel or 
more local if the health improvement occurs for particular ages. 
An increase in life expectancy may change the age profile of medical spending as well. In 
particular, increases in life expectancy may imply higher health-care costs. Indeed, this holds if 
the rise in longevity is ‘produced’ by new costly medical technologies. Jones (2002) describes a 
model in which longevity-increasing technological progress accounts for a large part of health 
expenditure growth. Empirically, however, the issue is unresolved. On a cross-country level, 
there is very little correlation between changes in life expectancy and changes in health 
expenditure.  
2.2  The mortality-related costs argument 
A major argument against the standard projection method relates to health spending in the last 
years of life. There is widespread empirical evidence now that medical spending in the last years 
of life relates to time to mortality (Lubitz & Riley, 1993, Zweifel et al., 1999 and Cutler & 
Meara, 1999). First, medical consumption of persons in the last year of life is considerably 
higher than that of persons of the same age who survive. Roos et al. (1987) demonstrate this for 
hospital services and nursing-home services. McGrail et al. (2000), Hogan et al. (2001) and 
Batljan & Lagergren (2004) provide similar evidence for health-care costs. According to these 
analyses, the costs of persons in the last year of their life can be six times higher than the costs 
of survivors. As a share of medical expenditure on the elderly, spending during the last year of 
life is found to be more than a quarter. Second, this feature is quite robust. It applies to different 
types of medical services and is observed in various countries. In addition, the share of 
mortality-related costs of total health-care costs of the elderly is surprisingly stable over time 
(Lubitz & Riley, 1993 and Hogan et al., 2001). Third, mortality-related costs are not restricted 
to the last year of life. Health-care costs are higher several years before mortality. The typical 
pattern is that health-care consumption increases as mortality approaches. Roos et al. (1987) 
demonstrate this for hospital and nursing-home usage. Stooker et al. (2001), Batljan & 
Lagergren (2004), Seshamani & Gray (2004) and Lubitz et al. (1995) respectively illustrate a 
negative relationship between health-care costs and time to mortality up to 2, 6, 15 and 17 years 
before mortality. Furthermore, Lubitz & Riley (1993), Stooker et al. (2001) and Levinsky et al. 
(2001) show that a negative relationship applies during the last year of life as well. Moreover, 
Seshamani & Gray (2004) find the effect of time to mortality upon health-care costs to be stable 
over time. 
Based on this evidence, we must conclude that older persons consume more overall health-care 
services not only because they are older, but also because they are closer to their mortality. 
Hence, time to mortality adds to age as a factor determining health-care spending. It is obvious 
that accounting for this mortality-related cost argument may change the predicted effects of 
population ageing. In particular, if population ageing is driven by the increase of life 
expectancies, one may expect age profiles to decline for those ages for which mortality rates 
decrease. 
Zweifel et al. (1999) suggest that health expenditure is completely independent of age, not only 
for people in the last years of their lives, but also for people of younger ages. Note that if this 
were true, health expenditure per capita may decline because of ageing. If health expenditure 
per capita increases as mortality approaches, health expenditure per capita decreases with time 
to mortality. The effect of ageing or, put better, increasing life expectancy, would then be to 
reduce health expenditure per capita (Westerhout, 2004).  
In this context, the time-to-mortality argument may be somewhat unrealistic. Much more 
plausible is a weaker form of the time-to-mortality argument, holding that time to mortality and CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 5 
 
age both explain health expenditure. Time to mortality can be the major driver of health 
expenditure for persons in the last years of their lives; for the majority of younger people, age 
may continue to be a very relevant explanatory variable. The effect of ageing upon health 
expenditure in this weak form of the time-to-mortality approach is then ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, what unambiguously holds true is that the ageing effect upon health expenditure 
is less strong under the time-to-mortality approach than under the standard projection approach. 
2.3  Implications for numerical simulation exercises 
Roos et al. (1987) were probably the first to make projections using this weak version of the 
time-to-mortality approach. They split the population into those who died within the projection 
period and those who survived, made separate cost projections for the two population groups 
and then combined the two into one aggregate projection. Roos et al. calculated that the rate of 
increase of hospital usage in the 1976-2000 period would amount to 64% rather than 73%, 
which would apply if the projection was made using the standard approach. The Van Ewijk et 
al. (2000) study for the Netherlands calculated that health expenditure growth in the period 
1998-2050 would decrease from 53 to 45% if the weak version of the time-to-mortality 
approach were substituted for the standard approach. The Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 
(2001) study compared the standard scenario with a scenario that corrects for mortality costs for 
three countries, namely Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. In all three cases, the expenditure 
projections for 2050 were considerably lower under the mortality-cost corrected method. Serup-
Hansen et al. (2002) found that including the mortality-cost argument would lower the projected 
increase of Danish health-care costs in the period 1995-2020 from 18.5 to 15.1%. Stearns & 
Norton (2004) calculated that Medicare expenditure as projected for 2020 could be between 9 
and 15% lower if adjustments were made for mortality-related costs. Batljan & Lagergren 
(2004) find a somewhat larger reduction in the health expenditure effect of ageing if the 
standard extrapolation method is replaced with the mortality-related cost approach: this effect 
would drop from 18 to 11%. Finally, Miller (2001) uses a time-until-mortality method to project 
the ageing-related shift in the age profile of health expenditure. This method does not 
decompose the population into survivors and decedents, but links the aggregate health 
expenditure profile to time until mortality rather than age. An increase in life expectancy then 
shifts the age profile of health expenditure to the right. As in the case of the other studies, Miller 
(2001) also finds significantly lower cost forecasts. 
This overview suggests that accounting for mortality-related costs may be important. Moreover, 
there is reason to believe that the above figures underestimate the significance of accounting for 
mortality-related costs. The point is that the significance of mortality-related costs depends on 
the strength of population ageing. Indeed, in a non-population ageing economy with a constant 
age structure, the issue of mortality-related costs would be irrelevant. As the trend of future 
population ageing is stronger than that in the past, figures based on previous demographic 
behaviour may underestimate the role of mortality-related costs. 
3.  Mortality-related costs  
3.1  Methodological issues  
Given that health-care expenditure is decomposed into a part that can be attributed to survivors 
and another part that can be attributed to decedents, one can separately project the development 
of health-care expenditures of survivors and decedents. Upon aggregation, total health-care 
expenditure can be calculated. Equivalently, one can calculate the age profile of aggregate 
health-care expenditure, which is a weighted average of the age profiles of survivors and 
decedents. On the basis of the age profile of aggregate health-care expenditure, one can project 6 | WESTERHOUT & PELLIKAAN 
the development of health-care expenditure through time. As in the standard approach, the 
development of health expenditure is calculated by combining demographic prospects with the 
age profile of health expenditure per capita. The difference between the mortality-related cost 
approach and the standard approach (which does not take into account the cost of dying) is that 
the age profile of health-care expenditure in the former approach is not exogenous, but 
endogenously related to the projected developments in mortality rates. 
Ideally, microeconomic data are used to assess the cost of dying. Indeed, most of the studies that 
apply the improved methodology pursue this route. These data often allow relating the cost of 
dying to gender and age. Sometimes, they even allow distinguishing between the costs in the 
last year of life, the next-to-last year of life and so on. This study does not employ 
microeconomic data, however. The reason is that we do not have such data available. We argue 
nonetheless that this may be less worrisome for our analysis than may seem at first sight. The 
reason is that our analysis focuses on the behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates rather than 
that of individuals. On this level, it may be more important to distinguish between the costs of 
survivors and decedents than to put in the most realistic estimates of the cost of dying, as long 
as the estimates of the cost of dying used in the simulations are not too distant from the real 
data. 
An important innovation of our study is that it applies the methodology of mortality-related 
costs separately for acute health- and long-term care. This may be crucial at the level of 
predicting the development of acute health-care expenditure and that of long-term care 
expenditure, since the age profiles for decedents differ quite a lot for these two spending 
categories. Given the distinction between acute health- and long-term care, we also have to split 
the cost of dying into two parts: one that corresponds to acute health-care expenditure and the 
remainder that corresponds to expenditure on long-term care.  
Let us now formally define survivors as those persons who live during the whole year and non-
survivors as those who die during the year. The number of survivors by age category j can be 
calculated as the fraction of people who live during the whole year  ) 1 ( ) , ( t j σ − , i.e. one minus 
the age-specific mortality rate, which varies by time t, multiplied by the size of the population in 
that age category at the beginning of the year. Likewise, the number of decedents can be 
calculated as the fraction of people who die during the year in a specific age category  ) , ( t j σ  (the 
age-specific mortality rate), multiplied by the size of the population in the specific age category 
at the beginning of the year. Death-related costs per capita are allowed to differ with age and 
year. Let us use  ) 0 , ( j D  to define the level of death-related costs in the base year (indexed 0). 
We decompose the cost of death D into an acute health- and long-term care component. The 
decomposition is age-specific. Formally, 
  ) 0 , ( ) ( ) , 0 , ( j j H j D D ε =  (1) 
  ) 0 , ( ) ( ) , 0 , ( ) 1 ( j j L j D D ε − =  (2) 
where  H and  L  refer to the acute health- and long-term care component respectively and  ) ( j ε  
is the age-dependent fraction of death-related costs that is spent on acute health care. 
By definition, expenditure per capita of the aggregate of survivors and decedents is a weighted 
average of the expenditure per survivor and the expenditure per decedent, where the mortality 
and survival rates act as weighting coefficients. This applies both to acute health- and long-term 
care.  
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 (j,t,k) = (1 – σ (j,t)) U(j,t,k) + σ (j,t)  D(j,t,k)   
  ) , ( L H k ∈   
Here,  U denotes health-care expenditure per survivor and T denotes health expenditure per 
capita for the whole of survivors and decedents. Given the assumptions made with respect to 
death-related costs and the information on total health expenditure per capita, we can calculate 
expenditure per capita of survivors as follows: 
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3.2  Aggregate age profiles  
The age profiles for public acute health-care expenditure and long-term care expenditure were 
taken from the EPC (2001) study mentioned earlier, which gives these age profiles for five-year 
age cohorts for most EU-15 countries.
1 Acute health-care expenditure refers to the costs 
associated with cure activities; long-term care expenditure refers to care activities or the costs 
that are required to help persons perform the essential tasks of living, which may be hampered 
through disability or other chronic illnesses.
2 These five-year age averages were subdivided into 
the respective age groups within those five years on an equal basis to obtain age profiles by age 
category. 
For those countries on which we do not have age profiles but do have aggregate information on 
acute health- and long-term care expenditures, we use the average acute health- and long-term 
care profiles of the countries for which we do have such information.
3 Since we do not have any 
information on health-care expenditures for Luxembourg, even on an aggregate level, we are 
not able to perform projections for this country and leave it out of the exercise. For Germany we 
use figures provided by the DIW. For this purpose, these figures were constructed to closely 
match the definitions for acute health- and long-term care costs as postulated by the Economic 
Policy Committee.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the age profiles of acute health- and long-term care for the EU-15 
countries for which this information is available. As can be expected, both categories of costs 
rise with age. While acute health-care costs rise gradually with age, the increase in long-term 
care costs is very steep after the age of 75. This can be explained by the fact that at that age 
people start to consume long-term care services on a large scale, such as nursing-home services. 
Furthermore, we can see that differences between countries are quite large, especially at higher 
ages. 
                                                      
1 We would like to thank Declan Costello of the EPC for supplying us with this information. 
2 For a precise definition of what kinds of services belong to either acute health care or long-term care, 
see the EPC (2001) report, Annex 4.  
3 See also Pellikaan & Westerhout (2005). 8 | WESTERHOUT & PELLIKAAN 
Figure 1. Health-care expenditures by age profile  
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Figure 2. Long-term care expenditures by age profile  
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3.3  Age profiles of survivors and decedents 
As previously discussed, we need a measure of the cost of mortality. Two aspects of this 
variable are important here: its level and its relationship with age. The studies mentioned in 
section 2 have either used hospital or insurance records to calculate mortality costs by specific 
age category, sometimes by gender and race. Owing to the difficulty of relating the precise CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 9 
 
outcomes in these studies to the health-care profiles we have,
4 as shown in Figures 1 and 2, we 
use the general implications that follow from these studies. Below we discuss some of the 
analyses that have investigated the pattern of the cost of mortality. 
Roos  et al. (1987) investigate the difference in health costs between survivors and non- 
survivors during the last four years before mortality. They include hospital usage, nursing-home 
usage and visits to physicians in their study on Manitoba in Canada. Not only do they find a 
significant difference in health-care usage between survivors and non-survivors (which 
increases as the time span to mortality becomes shorter), they also find that total health costs 
among decedents increase with age. This can be mainly attributed to the increase in mean days 
of residence in nursing homes, which rises rapidly with age. For example, they found that while 
male decedents aged 45-64 stay on average 7.2 days in nursing homes in the last year before 
dying, men above 85 years old stay on average 110.8 days in nursing homes in the last year 
before dying. Similar results apply to women. Overall, they find that the costs in the last four 
years of life of those aged 85 years and older are approximately 31% higher than those of 
individuals aged 75 to 84 and 79% higher than those of individuals aged 65 to 74. A similar 
conclusion was reached in a more recent study by Spillman & Lubitz (2000). 
Serup-Hansen  et al. (2002) have investigated the difference in the costs of health care for 
survivors and non-survivors in Denmark for all ages for both primary health-care services and 
hospital in-patient services. Owing to data limitations, they did not include long-term care costs. 
They found that the costs of non-survivors, i.e. the cost of mortality, are substantially higher 
than the costs of survivors for both health-care categories, although the differences are more 
marked for in-patient services. Moreover, they find that these costs decline with age and are 
highest at very young ages. Specifically, at young ages they find a large difference between the 
costs of survivors and non-survivors. At higher ages the average expenditures of both survivors 
and non-survivors are very similar. One possible reason they offer for these results regarding in-
patient services is that people at younger ages might receive higher priority relative to older age 
groups, thus pushing down average expenditures by age category. Levinsky et al. (2001) find 
similar evidence that health-care expenditure for decedents declines with age in an American 
study for California and Massachusetts. 
Based on these studies, we have decided to model the cost of mortality as a U-shaped function 
of age. At young ages, the cost of mortality is relatively high because of the expensive high-tech 
medical treatments that are at that age often used in order to save a young person’s life. From a 
certain age these costs then gradually decline. At higher ages, however, long-term care costs 
become important during the last years of life and this will result in an upward rise in total 
mortality costs by age. 
In particular, we divide the population into three broad age groups, those aged 0-34, 35-64 and 
65+, to respectively reflect the young, the middle-aged and the old-age categories. The cost of 
mortality may differ between these three age groups but is the same within each one. Second, 
we assume a constant cost of mortality as a benchmark that equals the highest average total cost 
of acute health- and long-term care, i.e. that of a person aged 95 and above. The implication of 
this approach is that the costs of non-survivors will be higher than the costs of survivors for all 
age groups under 95 as total health costs increase with age and reach their maximum at age 95. 
To reflect the difference in the average mortality cost between ages we then multiply this 
benchmark cost by different factors to obtain a U-shaped curve. In the earlier analysis (Pellikaan 
                                                      
4 Among other reasons, this is caused by fact that the specific health- and long-term care services 
investigated in the various studies do not always match the health- and long-term care services that are 
incorporated in our EPC profiles. 10 | WESTERHOUT & PELLIKAAN 
& Westerhout, 2005) we explored the sensitivity of this assumption by using either lower or 
higher mortality costs for certain age categories and found it to be relatively robust. 
Figure 3 illustrates that our projections assume that the per-capita costs of mortality for people 
in the 0-34 age group are equal to twice our benchmark cost of mortality (average health-care 
costs for a person aged 95); for those aged 35-64 they are assumed to be equal to this 
benchmark and for those aged 65 and older the costs they are assumed to be 1.5 times the 
benchmark. This approach obviously has its shortcomings in that it may not adequately 
represent real mortality costs; it is no more than an indication. This holds with respect to both 
the level and age structure of mortality-related costs and to its timing. Indeed, many studies 
have found that mortality-related costs spread out over many years, whereas our model assumes 
that the health-care spending of survivors and decedents differs in the last year of life only. 
Figure 3. Mortality-related costs, decomposed into acute health care and long-term care 
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As mortality-related costs are composed of both acute health- and long-term care expenditures 
and the composition of total expenditure in these two categories varies by age, the costs of death 
are subtracted from these respective components by different percentages at different ages. 
Table 1 shows our decomposition of D , based on findings by the Dutch WRR (1997).
5 The 
division into health- and long-term care components can easily be made by grouping the various 
types of expenditures in the categories mentioned. At young ages (0-54), the cost of mortality is 
thus in its total made up by health-care costs, while at higher ages a larger part of the cost of 
mortality is made up by long-term care costs. The observed pattern of the cost of mortality by 
age and health-care component also corresponds with the general findings of Roos et al. (1987) 
and Spillman & Lubitz  (2000). We apply this allocation of mortality-related costs to each 
country, except when the data show that such a division would be meaningless. Figure 3 shows 
the decomposition of mortality-related costs into the acute health-care component and the long-
                                                      
5 As the WRR did not investigate the structure of the cost of mortality for persons younger than age 55, 
we made an assumption about this structure for those aged 0-54. Owing to the relative small share of 
long-term care in the costs of mortality for those aged 55-64, we therefore assumed this to be zero for 
persons aged even younger. CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 11 
 
term care component.  H D  and  L D  represent the acute health- and long-term care components 
of death-related costs. It can be seen that as age increases,  H D declines and  L D increases. As 
noted, this pattern of increase was also found in some other studies. 
Table 1. Division of the costs of mortality by age category over health- and long-term care 
components (%) 
Age  
Health care  ) ( j ε  
% 
Long-term care ) 1 ( j ε −  
% 
0-54 100  0 
55-64 93  7 
65-69 91  9 
70-74 88  12 
75-79 79  21 
80-84 67  33 
85-89 57  43 
90+ 44 56 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figures 4 and 5 show that the T and U curves diverge, particularly at higher ages. The reason is 
that as a result of rising mortality rates, an increasing part of total spending on acute health- and 
long-term care is made up of mortality-related costs.  
Figure 4. Acute health-care costs, decomposed into the costs of survivors and decedents, in 
terms of benchmark costs of mortality 
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Figure 5. Long-term care costs, decomposed into the costs of survivors and decedents, in terms 
of benchmark costs of mortality 
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4. Living  longer 
The projections in this and the following sections concern the period from 2002-50. They use 
demographic projections from Eurostat and a bunch of other macroeconomic assumptions 
(regarding, among others, labour market participation, the interest rate, the rate of productivity 
growth and the income elasticity of health-care expenditure). Appendix A gives more 
information about the data we have used. Appendix B describes the model we have used in our 
calculations. 
No account is taken of many other factors that are known to influence health-care expenditures, 
such as the introduction of new medical technologies or the price development in medicines. 
The reason is that our analysis focuses on the implications of longevity and health status and 
does not aim at sketching a picture of the most likely future developments. 
Before presenting the living longer scenario, this section gives some information about the base 
case scenario. This scenario broadly coincides with the projections made for pension and health-
care expenditure in the EPC (2001) study. Our projections of health-care expenditure differ 
from the EPC study, however, owing to the inclusion of mortality-related costs. 
4.1  Demographic developments in the EU-15 area 
This section describes some of the demographic developments awaiting the EU-15 countries in 
the next 50 years. First, the ageing of the population, caused both by an increase in life 
expectancy and retirement of the baby-boom generation, will lead to a substantial increase in the 
number of elderly persons in the population of the EU. Second, the fertility rate is expected to 
decline. This will put pressure on the growth capacities of economies in the future as it reduces 
labour supply. 
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Old-age dependency ratios  
Figure 6 shows the development of the old-age dependency ratio in the EU, where the old-age 
dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of elderly persons (65 and over) to the working age 
population (20-64). For all countries of the EU-15 this ratio will increase substantially, but the 
differences across countries are marked. The countries that will see the largest rise in the 
number of elderly persons are Spain, Italy, Greece and Austria, which will see their old-age 
dependency ratio increase by 39, 38, 31 and 30 percentage points respectively. On the other 
hand, the old-age dependency ratio in countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Luxembourg compares favourably to the average trend seen in the other EU countries, with 
respective increases of 16, 17, 18 and 18 percentage points. In all countries it is the case that the 
old-age dependency ratio for men increases more sharply than for women, owing to the 
expected larger increase in life expectancy for men compared with women in the period up to 
2050.  
Figure 6. The development of the old-age dependency ratios in the EU  
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4.2  Assumptions in the base case scenario  
All our calculations aim at quantifying the extent to which current public institutions are 
unsustainable. Therefore, they sort of freeze current policy rules and deliberately exclude all 
kinds of possible future policy changes. This makes the simulations look a bit mechanical. But 
not doing so would severely hinder the task of assessing the sustainability of current public 
institutions. 
The labour productivity of all age groups is assumed to grow at an annual rate of 1.75% in all 
countries. The projections of labour force participation rates for the base case scenario are based 
on estimates used by the EPC of the European Community as prepared by the Ageing Working 
Group. These are in part based on projections by the International Labour Organisation until 
2010 and are adjusted from 2010 onwards in order to take account of the expected increase in 
the participation rates of women. The real interest rate is set at 3.75% and inflation at 2%. This 
gives a nominal interest rate of 5.75%. The government finance figures for the years 2001 to 14 | WESTERHOUT & PELLIKAAN 
2004 were taken from the OECD and are not cyclically adjusted. As these figures mostly 
correspond to a time when all economies had low growth rates and thus larger government 
deficits than in a neutral economic environment, government finances and government debt 
would evolve more positively if we had taken the cyclically adjusted figures.   
4.3  Assumptions in the living longer scenario 
In order to quantify the impact of a further increase in life expectancy, the mortality rates of 
persons in different age categories are reduced on top of the reductions already inherent in the 
Eurostat projections that were used in the base case scenario. In the current scenario we assume 
that mortality rates will decline by 35.7% in the projection period,
6 in gradual equal steps each 
year, for those aged 20 to 90. This scenario corresponds to the idea that life expectancy may 
significantly increase in the future and that the mortality rates at older ages, i.e. those between 
80 and 90, may decline at the same rate as those observed for young people.
7 Figure 7 shows the 
effect of this assumption on the survival probability of the EU population for the different 
demographic scenarios, where BC refers to the base case scenario and LL to the living-longer 
scenario.  
Figure 7. Survival probability of the EU population under different demographic scenarios 
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6 In Pellikaan & Westerhout (2005), we distinguished between three living longer scenarios, i.e. a low, 
middle and high scenario. The respective reduction in mortality rates in these scenarios was lower and 
higher than in the current living longer scenario, which corresponds to the middle living longer scenario 
in Pellikaan & Westerhout. Qualitatively, the other two scenarios are equivalent to the one presented here.  
7 This scenario follows the line of thinking of Vaupel (1998). He argues, however, that the decline in 
mortality rates for persons older than 80 years may exponentially increase with age. The mortality rates 
for persons aged 100 and over are thus expected to decline at higher rates than those for persons aged 85. 
He attributes this to the compositional change of the population as frailer individuals drop out of the 
population at earlier ages and only strong persons survive at late ages. The chosen decline in the living 
longer scenario may therefore underestimate the growth of the population of those aged 90 and older, or 
the oldest old. Given the relatively small number of people aged 80 and older, the impact of this error 
upon the predictions for macroeconomic aggregates may be modest. CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 15 
 
From Figure 7 it can be concluded that a further reduction in mortality rates leads to an outward 
shift of the survival probability curve. The initiated decline in the mortality rate in our living 
longer scenario corresponds to an extra increase in life expectancy of respectively 3.2 years at 
birth when compared with the increase in life expectancy projected in the base case scenario in 
2050. That is, the projected life expectancy at birth of a person born in 2050, which is 82.6 
years in the base case scenario, increases to 85.8 years in the living longer scenario.  
Table 2 compares the projected increases in expenditure on acute health care, long-term care 
and pensions in the living longer scenario with their counterparts in the base case scenario. The 
figures in the three right-hand columns reflect the additional increase or decrease in these 
expenditure categories in the living longer scenario.  
Table 2. Change in public expenditures in the living longer scenario (% of GDP) 
  Additional increase in living longer scenario 
  Acute health care  Long-term care  Pensions 
Austria   0.5 0.3 1.7
Belgium 0.4 0.3 1.3
Denmark  − 0.1 0.9 1.5
Finland   0.3 0.7 1.5
France   0.4 0.2 1.3
Germany   0.6 0.1 1.9
Greece   0.4 – 2.5
Ireland   0.3 0.2 0.9
Italy   0.5 0.1 1.5
Luxembourg – – 0.9
Netherlands   0.1 1.0 1.7
Portugal   0.5 – 1.4
Spain 0.6 – 1.8
Sweden   0.0 1.0 1.0
United Kingdom  0.1 0.7 0.5
EU average  0.4 0.4 1.4
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
4.4  Projections of acute health- and long-term care expenditures  
4.4.1  Acute health-care expenditures  
A further increase in life expectancy will in all countries, except Denmark, lead to an increase in 
acute health-care expenditure. The impact on this expenditure category will be largest for Spain 
and Germany, where it rises by an additional 0.6% of GDP when compared with the base case 
scenario (the second column of Table 2). For the EU, acute health-care expenditure will on 
average increase by 0.4% of GDP. The outcome that an increase in life expectancy leads to an 
increase in acute health-care expenditures is not as straightforward as it seems, however. A 
decline in mortality rates has two opposite effects. On the one hand, the reduction of mortality 
rates decreases health-care expenditure because it postpones some of the costs made in the last 
years of life. This effect is stronger the higher the costs of decedents are relative to survivors. 
On the other hand, an increase in life expectancy will expand the number of people who 
consume health for a longer period of time.  16 | WESTERHOUT & PELLIKAAN 
The balance between the two effects eventually determines whether an increase in life 
expectancy will decrease or increase health-care costs. The earlier study (Pellikaan & 
Westerhout, 2005) demonstrates that the former effect dominates in the first few years of the 
projection. After some time, however, the effect that relates to the expansion of the population 
becomes dominant. Eventually, an increase in life expectancy boosts health-care expenditure. 
4.4.2  Long-term care expenditures  
Long-term care expenditure is expected to increase on the same scale as health-care 
expenditure. Here, the results differ much more widely across countries. For example, while the 
projected increase in life expectancy only marginally influences long-term care expenditures in 
Germany and Italy, it significantly influences these expenditures in the Scandinavian countries 
and the Netherlands – countries that spend larger amounts on long-term care. In the latter group 
of countries, long-term care costs will increase approximately by an additional 1% of GDP. 
Long-term care costs are more sensitive to the ageing process than those on acute health care.  
4.4.3 Health-care  expenditures 
Compared with the base case scenario, health-care expenditure (the sum of expenditure on acute 
health- and long-term care) will increase on average by an additional 0.8% of GDP for the EU, 
ranging from 0.4% in Greece to 1.1% in the Netherlands. Despite the fact that a reduction in 
mortality rates directly reduces the strain that the process of dying puts on health-care 
expenditure, an increase in life expectancy significantly increases the total acute health- and 
long-term care expenditures.  
4.5  Projection of public pension expenditures 
A decline in mortality rates will lead to an increase in pension expenditures in all countries as 
the number of people who are eligible for pension benefits increases and they receive pensions 
over a longer period. In these projections we have not taken account of any specific rules in 
pension arrangements that lower pension benefits when life expectancy increases, which are 
important elements of pension schemes in some countries. The postulated decline in mortality 
rates will have the greatest impact on pension expenditure in Germany, Greece and Spain, with 
respective additional increases of 1.9%, 2.5% and 1.8% of GDP if life expectancy should 
improve further. Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK on the other hand are the countries that 
would be least affected by a further increase in life expectancy. Compared with the base case 
scenario, the postulated increase in life expectancy will lead to an additional increase of 1.4% of 
GDP in pension expenditure for the average EU country.  
4.6  Public finances  
Combining the three columns of Table 2, we notice that the increase in life expectancy of 3.2 
years will on average lead to a 2.2% increase of GDP in public expenditure. Luxembourg and 
the UK are the countries that are least affected by the postulated increase in life expectancy, 
while Greece and the Netherlands will face the largest increase in expenditures. Looking at the 
contributions of the health and pension components to this increase, one can depict that the 
increase in pensions is on average almost twice as large as that of health care, i.e. 1.4% 
compared with 0.8%. This result should partly be ascribed to the fact that a decline in mortality 
rates has two opposite effects on health-care expenditure, but not on pension expenditure. An 
increase in life expectancy will lead to more years of pensions to be paid and thus an increase in 
total expenditure. CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 17 
 
Table 5 in section 6.3 shows the change in the sustainability gaps caused by the projected 
increase in life expectancy when compared with the sustainability gaps found in the base case 
scenario. To keep government finances sustainable in this alternative demographic scenario, 
primary surpluses have to be increased by an additional 0.94% for the average EU country. If 
we look at the individual countries we see that the Netherlands, Greece and Germany would 
have to increase their primary surpluses the most to keep their government finances sustainable. 
This corresponds to the findings in Table 2, where the same countries showed the highest 
increase in public expenditure in the living longer scenario. As explained, the largest part of the 
change in the sustainability gaps can be attributed to the change in pension expenditure. The UK 
is the country that is least affected by a further increase in life expectancy.
8 In the UK the 
required adjustment in primary surpluses can be mainly explained by the increase in health-care 
expenditure.  
5. Living  in  better  health 
In this section we investigate how an improvement in health will impact on the projections of 
health and pension expenditures and public finances. Continuous improvements in the health 
status of the population have at least two effects. First, healthier people can be assumed to need 
less medical attention. Increases in the average health status of a population can thus help to 
economise on health-care expenditure. Second, an increase in health may postpone early 
retirement and reduce the inflow into disability schemes, thus increasing labour market 
participation and reducing the number of persons aged 55 and over living on social security. 
This section quantifies the impact of health improvements. Quantification may be even more 
interesting than sketching the sign of the effects of better health. In particular, quantification 
helps us to answer the question of whether the effect is sufficiently large to counteract the effect 
resulting from population ageing (see also Jacobzone et al., 2000). 
5.1  Projections of acute health- and long-term care expenditures 
This section assumes that health status improves according to the variable ‘life expectancy in 
good health’, of which the development is shown in Table A.1 in Appendix A. As reported 
above, we assume the elasticity guiding the relation between health expenditure and health 
status to be −0.3 for the ages 0-64 and −0.2 for the ages 65 and over. Yet health-care 
expenditure does not necessarily decline because of an improvement in health, since an 
improvement in health increases labour supply and thus GDP. Following extensive literature 
that shows a clear link between health expenditure and income, we assume that health-care 
expenditure increases on account of an increase in GDP. Table 3 shows the projections of health 
and long-term care expenditures when the above-mentioned features are incorporated in the 
projections. 
5.1.1  Acute health care expenditures 
An improvement in health decreases acute health-care expenditure when compared with the 
base case scenario. On average, expenditure will decrease by 0.8% of GDP for this category for 
the EU. The effect differs by country and the reduction in expenditures will be largest in those 
countries with the largest expected health improvement, which are Germany, Italy and Portugal. 
In all countries, expenditure on acute health care declines. Hence, the increase in this type of 
                                                      
8 The figures for Luxembourg are not very reliable because of the lack of essential information on the 
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expenditure on account of additional income growth only partly offsets the reduction that is due 
to improved medical conditions.  
Table 3. Change in public expenditures in the living in better health scenario (% of GDP) 
  Additional increase in living in better-health scenario 
  Acute health care Long-term care Pensions
Austria   − 0.8 − 0.2 − 0.9
Belgium  – 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.8
Denmark  – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.7
Finland   – 0.6 – 0.4 – 1.1
France   – 0.7 – 0.2 – 1.2
Germany   – 1.3 – 0.1 – 1.1
Greece   – 0.5 - – 1.0
Ireland   – 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.4
Italy   – 1.0 – 0.2 – 0.7
Luxembourg - - –  1.0
Netherlands   – 0.3 – 0.3 – 1.0
Portugal   – 1.5 - – 1.6
Spain  – 0.6 - – 0.7
Sweden   – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.7
United Kingdom  – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.4
EU average  – 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.9
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
5.1.2  Long-term care expenditures 
An improvement in health likewise reduces the expenditure on long-term care. For the EU 
average, Table 3 shows that expenditure in the living in better health scenario will be 0.2% of 
GDP lower than those in the base case scenario. The savings on long-term care expenditure are 
less than those on acute health-care expenditure for two reasons. First, countries spend less on 
long-term care than on acute health care. Hence, savings on long-term care can be expected to 
be less. Second, long-term care services are consumed more heavily by older people. As we 
have assumed expenditure on long-term care to be less dependent on health status for the group 
aged 65+, the reduction in long-term care expenditure is also smaller. Still, for individual 
countries the savings on long-term care expenditure can be substantial, as is the case in the 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and the UK. 
5.1.3 Health-care  expenditures 
The total of acute health- and long-term care expenditure will on average decline by 1.0% of 
GDP for the EU when compared with the base case scenario. Thus, the expected improvement 
in health leads to a rosier picture on the development of expenditure. 
5.2  Projection of public pension expenditures 
Table 3 also shows the projected change in pension expenditure in the living in better health 
scenario. An improvement in health will as explained lead to a decline in the number of 
recipients and thus less expenditure on pension benefits – a reduction of 0.9% compared with 
the base case scenario for the average EU country. The countries that will benefit most from the 
incorporation of a health trend in the projections are once again the countries with the largest CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 19 
 
health improvements. The size of the projected decline in expenditure is similar to that of the 
projected reduction in expenditure on health care. 
5.3  Public finances  
The improvement in health reduces expenditure on health care and pensions by 1.9% of GDP, 
but there are substantial differences across countries. Compared with the base case scenario, the 
living in better health scenario features less pressure on public finances. Table 5 in section 6.3 
shows the corresponding change in sustainability gaps. All countries show more favourable 
government finances and on average the sustainability gap for the EU will decline by 0.8%. In 
the living in better health scenario, four countries would not have any sustainability problems. 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Belgium would not have to increase their primary surpluses in 
order to make their policies sustainable. Notwithstanding this improvement, the sustainability of 
government finances would remain a serious problem at the EU-15 level.  
6.  Living longer in better health  
In this section we combine the scenarios we have run in sections 4 and 5 into a living longer in 
better health scenario. We will thus assume that life expectancy increases as postulated in the 
living longer scenario (section 4) and that the health status of the population improves according 
to the assumptions made in the living in better health scenario (section 5). 
6.1  Projections of health- and long-term care expenditures 
Table 4 shows the change in acute health- and long-term care expenditure in the living longer in 
better health scenario, as compared with the base case scenario.  
Table 4. Change in public expenditure in the living longer in better health scenario (% of GDP) 
  Additional increase in living longer in better health scenario 
  Acute health care Long-term care Pensions
Austria   – 0.4 0.0 0.7
Belgium –  0.2 0.1 0.4
Denmark –  0.4 0.5 0.8
Finland   – 0.4 0.2 0.3
France   – 0.4 0.0 0.0
Germany   – 0.8 – 0.1 0.7
Greece   – 0.1 - 1.4
Ireland   – 0.2 0.1 0.4
Italy   – 0.6 – 0.1 0.7
Luxembourg - - –  0.1
Netherlands   – 0.2 0.6 0.5
Portugal   – 1.2 - – 0.4
Spain 0.0 - 1.0
Sweden   – 0.5 0.2 0.3
United Kingdom  – 0.2 0.4 0.0
EU average  – 0.4 0.1 0.4
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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6.1.1  Acute health-care expenditures 
Living longer in better health reduces expenditure on acute health care when compared with the 
base case scenario. The reason is that the savings that are the result of health improvements 
dominate the expenditure increase that results from a lengthening of lives. In particular, the 
improvement in health reduces expenditure by 0.8% of GDP, whereas the increase in life 
expectancy increases expenditure by 0.4% of GDP. 
6.1.2  Long-term care expenditures 
For long-term care expenditures, the picture is the opposite of that above: long-term care 
expenditure will increase in the living longer in better health scenario, although only by a very 
small margin, i.e. 0.1% of GDP for the average EU-15 country. Now, the living longer effect 
dominates the health effect. The living longer effect increases expenditure by 0.4% of GDP, 
while the expected health change leads to a spending decline of 0.2% of GDP. Again, the results 
differ widely among countries. In some countries, living longer in better health reduces long-
term care expenditure; in other countries, it increases long-term care expenditure. 
6.1.3 Health-care  expenditures 
Living longer in better health reduces the expenditure on health care if compared with the base 
case scenario. For the EU as a whole, the positive effect from living in better health dominates 
the negative effect from a longer life expectancy. For most countries, living longer in better 
health reduces expenditure on health care. For some countries, however, health-care expenditure 
does not change or even increases as an effect of the combination of better health and longer life 
expectancy.  
6.2  Projections of public pension expenditures 
Table 4 shows that for the average EU-15 country, living longer in better health will lead to a 
0.4% increase in expenditures on pensions when compared with the base case scenario. The 
effect of living longer thus outweighs the effect of better health. Results again differ from 
country to country, even on a qualitative basis.  
6.3  Public finances  
The effect of living longer in better health upon public expenditure is relatively small. The 
increase in health expenditure is smaller than in the base case scenario, whereas that of pension 
expenditure is larger. On average, a modest effect results of 0.1% of GDP. 
Table 5 shows the change in sustainability gaps in this scenario. Compared with the base case 
scenario, the sustainability gap for the average EU country will increase by 0.1% of GDP (the 
sustainability gap declined by 0.8% in our living in better health scenario while it increased by 
1.0% of GDP in the living longer scenario).  CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 21 
 
Table 5. Sustainability gaps in the three scenarios 
  Differences with base case scenario 
  Living longer 
scenario
Better-health 
scenario
Living longer in 
better health 
scenario
Denmark 1.1 –  0.4 0.6
Sweden 0.9 –  0.7 0.2
Belgium   0.9 – 0.7 0.1
Austria   1.2 – 0.9 0.1
Finland   1.1 – 1.1 0.0
Italy   0.8 – 1.0 – 0.3
United Kingdom  0.5 – 0.1 0.3
Ireland 0.7   –  0.3 0.4
Luxembourg 0.4 0.1 0.4
Netherlands   1.4 – 0.8 0.5
Portugal 0.9 –  0.9 –  0.2
Spain   1.0 – 0.6 0.4
France   0.9 – 0.9 – 0.1
Germany 1.2 –  1.4 –  0.3
Greece   1.4 – 0.7 0.6
EU average   1.0 − 0.8  0.1
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 8 shows the debt development for the average EU country in the four scenarios we have 
discussed so far, where BC refers to the base case, LL to living longer, LLIB to living in better 
health and LLIBH to living longer in better health.  
Figure 8. Debt developments – the EU average in four scenarios 
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The debt developments are most unstable and the sustainability problems most severe in the 
living longer scenario. On the other side of the spectrum is the living in better health scenario. 
Interestingly, the debt development in the LLIBH scenario is slightly less unstable than in the 
BC scenario, whereas the calculated sustainability gap is a little larger. The explanation is that 
the graph runs until 2050; however, our calculation of the sustainability gap takes account of the 
developments in primary deficits until infinity. Somewhere beyond 2050, the curve that 
describes the debt development in the living longer in better health scenario will cross the curve 
that corresponds to the base case scenario. Yet irrespective of the criteria one uses to evaluate 
the debt development in the two scenarios, the conclusion is that living longer in better health 
does not overturn the analysis that is implicit in our base case scenario for the average EU 
country and the whole of public finances.  
7. Policy  options 
This section reviews some policy options that governments have to improve the sustainability of 
public finances. Each of these options is analysed on its merits and specifically with regard to 
how it affects economic efficiency and solidarity both within and between generations. We 
stress that the overview of available options is in no way meant to be exhaustive. Nor does it 
imply a preference for any specific option. We concentrate on four sets of policy instruments at 
the disposal of governments. These are respectively taxation policies, labour force participation 
policies, reforms of pension schemes and reforms of the health-care sector. In addition, the 
timing is relevant: should policy reforms be adopted as soon as possible or should they be 
delayed for some period of time? We first focus on this timing issue. 
7.1  The timing of policy reforms  
In plain language, our calculations of the sustainability gap indicate how much money a 
government is short of. In particular, the calculations indicate the amounts of money that should 
be raised in order to prevent the government from becoming insolvent in the end. The 
calculations do not tell us when policy reforms should be started, however. This could be now, 
five or ten years from now or any other time. Obviously, the different options are not 
equivalent. In general, the longer policy reforms are postponed, the larger are the policy changes 
that will be needed. In addition, different options have different consequences for 
intergenerational distribution. Generally, the longer policy reforms are delayed, the greater will 
be the burden for future generations and the smaller that for current generations. If we adopt the 
principle of concave utility, it is easy to show that spreading the burden across several 
generations is superior to putting the burden on a small group of generations. This principle 
implies that it would be better not to put off policy reforms. 
If the policy change takes the form of a tax increase, considerations of efficiency play an 
important role. Assuming that lump-sum taxes are unavailable, the government has to resort to 
distortionary tax instruments. Economic theory tells us that distortionary effects are smaller, the 
lower the intertemporal variability in tax rates is. As the required increase in tax rates will be 
smaller if the policy of increasing tax rates is implemented sooner, tax rates are intertemporally 
more stable, which provides a second argument for the rapid implementation of policy changes. 
An argument against fast implementation of policy changes that is frequently heard is that 
current generations would pay twice. First, they would pay for their own social security, health 
care and pensions. Second, they would pay to solve the sustainability problems that are the 
result of population ageing. That the proposal to start policy changes as soon as possible makes 
some generations pay twice is of course true. Nevertheless, that does not mean this is a bad 
policy. Some generations have to pay twice anyhow; otherwise, the sustainability problem CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 23 
 
cannot be solved. It is important to recognise that the ageing problem is general, i.e. not caused 
by specific generations and it is therefore not obvious that specific generations should finance 
the fiscal deficit. Therefore, a case can be made for letting all generations, current and future, 
contribute to solving the financial problems that stem from population ageing. 
Another argument against fast implementation is that of ongoing economic growth. Ongoing 
economic growth makes future generations richer than current generations and makes it easier 
for future generations to carry the burden of higher taxes. This argument does not hold if utility 
does not expand in line with income, however. Indeed, intergenerational equity calls for 
equalisation of marginal utility, not marginal income. Unfortunately, there is very little 
empirical research on this theme that allows for further operationalisation. 
7.2  Tax policies  
In comparing different types of tax instruments, at least three criteria play a role. These are 
economic efficiency, intergenerational equity and intragenerational equity. Economic efficiency 
is maximised if the tax instrument chosen is that which would least distort labour/leisure and 
investment/savings decisions. In this respect, indirect taxation (e.g. consumption taxes) is 
superior to direct taxation (e.g. labour income taxes) if indirect taxes have a larger tax base. 
Intergenerational equity may also be achieved more easily by choosing indirect taxation as the 
elderly do pay consumption taxes, but not labour income taxes. Yet intragenerational equity 
may be reduced more if consumption taxes are increased. 
The list of possible tax instruments is much longer that the criteria listed above. Next to 
consumption and labour income taxes, most countries levy taxes on capital income, wealth, 
profits of firms, bequests, etc. Moreover, taxes often include differentiated rates, thresholds, 
ceilings, exemptions and variations in all these aspects, which may have an impact on economic 
efficiency and intergenerational or intragenerational equity. Further, the effects of tax policies 
depend on a number of factors that may differ from country to country. Without further 
analysis, it is difficult to say anything about the kind of tax policies one could think of in order 
to restore fiscal sustainability.  
7.3  Expenditure policies in general 
Another way to restore fiscal sustainability is to cut public expenditures. The government can 
for example allow certain expenditure categories, for certain time periods, to grow at a lower 
rate than that of GDP. A direct cut in expenditures on health care and pensions would benefit 
young and future generations, while it would hurt the current generations (which use these 
services most intensively) if these cuts lead to deterioration in the quantity or quality of these 
services. 
Here the comment that was made in the discussion on tax policies applies as well. In a general 
sense, we cannot point to a particular expenditure item that should be adjusted in order to 
achieve fiscal sustainability without further research. The same can be said about the trade-off 
between tax increases and public expenditure cuts. In particular, in order to be able to compare 
specific tax changes with changes in specific types of public spending, more information is 
needed on the way the tax and expenditure category affect economic efficiency and equity, both 
in an intergenerational and in an intragenerational sense. If the tax under consideration is highly 
distortionary and the expenditure category does not affect economic behaviour of any kind, the 
tax option will obviously be less attractive from an efficiency point of view (although not 
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7.4  Labour force participation policies  
An increase in labour force participation can significantly improve public finances. As can be 
concluded from EPC (2001), labour force participation rates are expected to increase in the 
period between 2000 and 2050. This can be especially attributed to the expected increase in the 
labour force participation of women. If this occurs without government intervention, this is 
good news from the perspective of the population ageing problem. Indeed, increased levels of 
labour market participation have effects opposite to those of an ageing population: they raise tax 
revenues and social security contributions and reduce public spending on social security. If 
higher levels of labour market participation can be achieved by only subsidising it (explicit 
subsidies or specific tax reliefs), the message is somewhat different. For example, the 
government may have to revise tax rules or support and possibly subsidise the availability of 
childcare in order to increase the labour market participation of female workers. Then, other 
taxes have to be raised again (or additional expenditure cuts have to be made) in order to pay for 
these policies. Whether the fiscal situation improves then depends on the relation between the 
amount of subsidisation and the induced changes in labour market participation. 
Policies aimed at increasing the participation of elderly persons differ importantly from policies 
that focus on women’s labour participation. The labour force participation rates for persons aged 
55 and over are pretty low. The high levels of non-participation of these age groups can be 
attributed to a significant degree to the financial incentives that are implicit in early retirement 
schemes. These incentives are often such that participation in early retirement schemes is ‘an 
offer you cannot refuse’. In this case, governments could reduce subsidies to increase 
participation. This is very different from the case of female workers, which calls for more 
subsidies. Obviously, apart from these fiscal effects, the distributional effects of policies 
focused on female workers and older workers are also different. Again, such aspects should be 
taken into account before coming to a final verdict. 
7.5  Pension policies  
Another measure one could think of is to reduce the generosity of PAYG pensions or to increase 
the retirement age. Both policy measures would help restore the sustainability of fiscal policies, 
but would hurt the generations that are currently retired or close to retirement. 
Countries that have privately funded pensions may face sustainability problems as well. 
Although population ageing has no direct effect upon the public budget through private 
pensions, it may indirectly affect the budget, particularly, if the principle of deferred taxation 
applies, as the increase in the number of retired people brings in tax revenues. One way of 
reforming pension schemes is to remove the subsidisation of these schemes. This would make 
the pension system more actuarially fair, which would induce people to retire at later ages. 
People would still be able to retire at earlier ages, but this would not come at the expense of 
public resources. Both policy options would jeopardise intergenerational solidarity however, as 
the price to be paid for the achievement of fiscal sustainability would rest on the shoulders of 
particular generations. 
Another option is to index pension benefits negatively to life expectancy. The result of such an 
option may be very similar to that of blunt cuts in the levels of pension benefits. Because of the 
slow changes in life expectancy, changes could also occur very gradually. This strategy would 
spread losses over more generations and would allow people to anticipate future policy changes, 
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7.6  Health-care policies  
To mitigate the effect of population ageing on health-care expenditures, several options are 
available. Health-care budgets may be frozen for several years or expenditures cut so that 
health-care expenditures grow at a slower rate than GDP for a number of years. This would 
come at the expense of those persons who are dependent on the provision of health-care services 
and do not have the resources to buy private insurance. These policies would hurt current 
generations and benefit future generations and thus affect intergenerational solidarity. Yet, 
privatisation policies would also affect solidarity within generations. In particular, privatisation 
would hurt those who rely to a relatively large extent on the health-care sector. 
Policies that would help to restore fiscal sustainability without directly affecting 
intergenerational solidarity could be those that enhance the level of competition in health-care 
markets. In particular, policies of managed competition may be successful to drive down the 
level of aggregate health-care expenditure when private insurers are induced to bargain 
aggressively with health-care providers about the price, the quality and the volume of medical 
services. The price to be paid now is that insurers may adopt not only bargaining policies to 
lower their costs, but also risk-selection policies. This approach would reduce the degree of 
solidarity, not so much between generations, but more within generations, between the good and 
bad risks. 
7.7  Strengthening the economy   
An increase in productivity does not necessarily improve public finances if, as we assumed, all 
expenditure categories and most notably expenditures on health care and pensions are related to 
wage increases. Still, targeted investments in both physical and human capital may increase 
society’s capacity to cope with the population ageing problem. It could make it easier for 
example to induce reforms in the pension and health-care systems, from public provision to 
private provision. In this indirect sense, policies that boost productivity could be very welcome. 
Obviously, combining policies that raise productivity with policies that unlink expenditure 
levels with private-sector wage rates will also be helpful. Ultimately, the attractiveness of 
policies that raise productivity is determined by the benefits in terms of higher tax revenues and 
lower levels of public expenditure and the costs in terms of tax facilities or explicit subsidies. 
7.8 Concluding  remarks 
As often noted in the report, we cannot tell which policy options are most preferable. All or 
most of the policy options one can think of to restore fiscal solvency have effects not only on 
economic efficiency, but also on different forms of equity. In case of contrary effects, it is 
policy-makers who should weigh the different objectives of the social welfare function and 
come to a decision. 
Another element of importance is the variability that surrounds calculations. Calculations of the 
fiscal impact of population ageing are uncertain, owing to among others the uncertainty of 
different variables that are relevant to this issue – demographic and economic. Calculations of 
the impact of policies are surrounded by uncertainty as well. This caveat warns against an 
overly literal interpretation of the results of our analysis.  | 26 
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Appendix A. Data 
In this section we first briefly give attention to the demographic developments in the EU-15 area 
in the period until 2050 and then explore in more detail the data that we have used. 
Demography 
Population, mortality, migration and fertility figures were based on Eurostat 2000 figures, the 
central variant.
9 These figures are projections to the year 2050 by specific age category, i.e. age 
0 to 90+. Because of the importance we attach to the oldest group in accurately determining the 
development of the use of health-care services and thereby expenditures, a further split in the 
oldest age group, i.e. 90+ was needed. In Pellikaan & Westerhout (2005), a description is given 
of how this desired split was obtained. 
Pellikaan & Westerhout (2005) also report on the development of the mortality rates as expected 
in the period between 2002 and 2050. Mortality rates decline, although somewhat less for 
higher ages. Nevertheless, the declines are still quite substantial for the oldest old. 
Pension expenditure  
Aggregate figures for pension expenditures are taken from the EPC (2001) study. Public 
pension expenditure, including most public replacement revenues, is given for persons aged 55 
and over as a percentage of GDP in the year 2000 for every EU country. As we want our base 
case scenario to resemble the 2050 figures for pension expenditures in the EPC study, we use 
the yearly indexation as a calibration tool to arrive approximately at these figures.
10 Thus both 
the figures in 2002 and 2050 coincide largely with those of the EPC study in our base case 
scenario. The time path between these periods will however differ, owing to the different 
dynamics of our own model. 
We equate the number of beneficiaries aged 65 and older to the number of persons aged 65 and 
over. For the persons aged 55 to 64 we use data from wave 7 of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) to obtain the percentage of persons in this age category who receive 
either a pre-retirement pension, disability or unemployment benefit. We used the ECHP 
questions on income to derive the respective percentages of persons who are unemployed, 
disabled or who have retired early by age category. 
The number of people who are eligible for a benefit may be overestimated in our model and the 
per capita benefits underestimated. This is especially true for those countries where, for 
example, a large number of women receive no pension or for those countries that have a 
relatively large percentage of people out of the labour force who receive no entitlements. 
Nevertheless, this should not have any consequences for our projections of aggregate pension 
expenditure. 
Health status indicator  
It is difficult to measure the health status of the population and to predict the change in this 
status through time. Self-assessed health data usually lack reliability (see Ahn et al., 2004b and 
Bound, 1991).  
                                                      
9 See Pellikaan & Westerhout (2005) for an overview of the data. 
10 Ibid. 30 | WESTERHOUT & PELLIKAAN 
A more objective measure for the change in health through time may be life expectancy in good 
health. FEDEA has projected the future development of this indicator as part of the AGIR 
project. Life expectancy in good health is given both at age 15 and age 65 for both sexes. Our 
aim is to use the change in health status, which can be derived from changes in the remaining 
life expectancies, to project changes in labour force participation and in health expenditure. 
Table A.1 shows the evolution of these indicators to 2025 and the implied percentage change in 
health status, which can be derived from these developments, i.e. between 1996 and 2025. As 
we perform projections to 2050, we assume that health will develop at the same annual rate in 
the period between 2026 and 2050 as in the period between 1996 and 2025. For the countries 
for which this information is not available, we have assumed that their health change 
corresponds to that of the average EU country. This is the case for Austria, Finland, 
Luxembourg and Sweden.  
Table A.1 Remaining life expectancy in good health at ages 15 and 65 (in years)  
                Age 15  % change                Age 65  % change 
 1996  2025 1996-2025 1996 2025  1996-2025
Austria n.a.  n.a. 10.2 n.a. n.a.  54.3
Belgium 44.6  49.1 10.1 7.6 10.5  37.5
Denmark 46.2  50.3 8.9 8.2 10.7  29.9
Finland   n.a.  n.a. 10.2 n.a. n.a.  54.3
France 36.6  40.8 11.7 5.3 7.8  47.8
Germany 28.6  33.9 18.2 3.0 5.9  101.0
Greece 47.4  50.1 5.8 5.8 8.0  37.8
Ireland 48.4  52.7 8.8 8.3 11.3  35.5
Italy 35.9  39.8 10.8 3.4 6.2  80.4
Luxembourg n.a.  n.a. 10.2 n.a. n.a.  54.3
Netherlands   45.0  48.6 7.9 7.7 10.4  34.3
Portugal 29.3  33.4 13.7 1.7 4.0  135.2
Spain 40.7  43.0 5.6 5.4 7.1  31.7
Sweden   n.a.  n.a. 10.2 n.a. n.a.  54.3
United Kingdom  42.9  47.3 10.0 9.3 11.8  26.5
Source: Ahn et al. (2004b). 
Relation between health status and labour market participation  
As many studies have shown,
11 better health is positively correlated with actively being at work, 
especially at later ages. People with bad health are more likely to retire at earlier ages either 
through disability or unemployment schemes. Next to financial incentives,
12 health is the most 
important variable explaining the transition out of work before the legal retirement age. 
McGarry (2004) even finds poor health to have a substantially larger effect upon retirement 
expectations than financial variables. 
For our projections, we are especially interested in the impact of health upon the decision to 
leave the labour force. For this purpose, we use existing studies on this subject to calculate 
elasticities that present this relation. From the analysis by Börsch-Supan (2000) we derive an 
elasticity of 0.8. A 1% increase in average health would thus lead to 0.8% fewer people quitting 
                                                      
11 See for example Börsch-Supan (2000) and Kerkhofs et al. (1999). For an overview of the 
retirement/health literature, see Heyma (2001).   
12 See Piekkola & Leijola (2004) and Gruber & Wise (2002).  CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 31 
 
the labour force. By varying the health changes in the simulations we tested the sensitivity of 
this relation and found that it was robust for different changes and ages. This elasticity has been 
applied in a uniform manner in all EU countries.  
Relation between health status and health expenditure  
Healthier people may be assumed to consume health-care services to a lesser degree than people 
with a worse health status. An improvement in health over time would thus lead to a decline in 
health expenditures for the average person. Note that this assumes that this health improvement 
is a genuine exogenous improvement in health without any associated increase in medical 
treatment and likewise expenditures, for example owing to changed health behaviour in the past. 
Obviously, this assumption may be overly optimistic, but we lack a better alternative. As we do 
not have country-specific information about the relation between health status and expenditure, 
we apply the results from the literature uniformly to all EU-15 countries. 
Lubitz et al. (2003) investigate the relation between health, life expectancy and health care for 
Medicare-insured persons aged 70 and over in the US. This study concentrates on the difference 
in lifetime expenditures between people with various health states,
13 but average health-care 
expenditures by health status and broad age group are also reported. As we have already 
incorporated demographic developments in our model it is precisely the annual difference in 
expenditures between various health states that we are looking for. Lubitz et al. find that active 
persons with no limitations spend on average $4,600 per year on health care, while people with 
a Nagi limitation
14 in the same age group spend on average $5,800 per year on health care. 
Healthier people thus spend on average 20% less on health care than people with a Nagi 
limitation. 
We use this relation to link health changes to health expenditures for those persons aged 65 and 
over. For example, a positive average health change of 5% per year will then lead to a 1% 
reduction in total expenditures. For persons below that age we have no specific information. We 
assume that the corresponding elasticity equals -0.3 for this age category. 
Government statistics 
Total government revenues, expenditures and debt figures for the years 2001-04 are taken from 
the OECD general government statistics. To calculate the amount spent on disability benefits 
and other social security benefits we use the percentages found in the social expenditure 
database of the OECD, which gives the percentages of GDP spent on public social expenditures. 
Pension and health expenditures follow from our own calculations. Education expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP are taken from the EPC study in 2003.  
                                                      
13 They find that lifetime expenditures on health care do not differ among persons with different health 
states. This can be attributed to the fact that while people in good health spend on average less on health 
care per year compared with people in bad health, they tend to live longer. Overall expenditures are 
therefore not found to differ much between various health states if one looks at health-care costs accrued 
during the remaining lifetime.  
14 A Nagi limitation was defined as difficulty performing or inability to perform at least one of five 
activities: stooping, crouching or kneeling; lifting or carrying objects weighing up to 4.5 kg (10 lb); 
extending the arms above the shoulder; grasping small objects; and walking two to three blocks (Lubitz et 
al., 2003). | 32 
Appendix B. The Simulation Model  
This appendix summarises the model that is used to calculate the developments in health 
expenditures, pension expenditures and public finances under different scenarios. It describes 
the model for a particular country. For brevity, we omit the country index. 
Demographics 
To simulate demographic changes, the total population is decomposed into its three respective 
segments. First, net migration – that is immigration minus emigration; second, mortality; and 
third, fertility. Population in year t with age j can, aside for those that are aged 0,
15 be calculated 
as the sum of the population in the previous year plus any net migration and mortality that 
occurred during the year itself. Or  
  ) , 1 , ( ) , , 1 ( ) , , 1 ( ) , 1 , ( ) , , 1 ( s t j s t j s t j s t j s t j POP NMIGR POP POP − + + − + − + = σ   with  99 0 ≤ ≤ j  (A.1) 
with srepresenting gender, NMIGR representing net migration and σ denoting the mortality 
rate. After reaching age 99, all persons are assumed to die. By changing mortality rates, we can 
derive other demographic scenarios, which can either represent an increase or decrease in life 
expectancy.  
Health-care expenditures 
We assume all types of health-, acute and long-term care expenditures by survivors and 
decedents to grow at the rate of labour productivity growth p, which we will take to be a 
constant. In addition, health expenditure per capita may fall owing to improvements in the 
health status (see below).  
  t
s t j j h
t
k j k t j p U U ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) , , ( ) ( ) , 0 , ( ) , , ( θ ε − + =           ) , ( L H k ∈  (A.1) 
  t
s t j j h
t
k j k t j p D D ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) , , ( ) ( ) , 0 , ( ) , , ( θ ε − + =
        
) , ( L H k ∈  (A.2) 
Here, H and L refer to acute health- and long-term care respectively. Aggregate health-care 
expenditures,  T , can be derived by summing the expenditures of survivors and those of 
decedents: 
  ) , , ( ) , ( ) , , ( ) , ( ) , , ( ) 1 ( k t j t j k t j t j k t j D U T σ σ + − =
              ) , ( L H k ∈  (A.3) 
Health-care expenditure and its components do not distinguish between men and women. 
Hence, the mortality rates in equation A.4 denote the averages of the corresponding mortality 
rates for men and women.  
The aggregates of acute health-care expenditures, AHCEXP, long-term care expenditures, 
LTCEXP and health-care expenditures, HCEXP, follow upon multiplying the per capita 
variables with the corresponding population sizes and adding up:  
 
∑ =
j
t j H t j t POP T AHCEXP ) , ( ) , , ( ) (
 (A.4) 
                                                      
15 The population at age 0 is equal to the respective number of births in that year.  CAN WE AFFORD TO LIVE LONGER IN BETTER HEALTH? | 33 
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t j L t j t POP T LTCEXP ) , ( ) , , ( ) (
 (A.5) 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( t t t LTCEXP AHCEXP HCEXP + =
 (A.6) 
The population variable POP sums the populations of men and women. 
Pension expenditures   
Pension expenditures are calculated in a straightforward manner. In the base year the aggregate 
amount of public replacement revenues
16 for persons aged 55 and above is divided over all 
individuals, men and women, who are eligible for these arrangements. From this we obtain 
average pension expenditure or benefit per person or those eligible. The average pension benefit 
increases through time at a rate  p β ;  β  is an indexation factor, which differs across EU 
countries. Annual labour productivity growth p is uniform across countries. The development of 
pension expenditures by age category can then be calculated by multiplying the average pension 
benefit per person  PB with the number of persons who are eligible for a pension in each 
respective year,  E :  
  ) , , ( ) ( ) , , ( s t j t s t j E PB PEXP =  (A.7) 
  t
t p PB PB ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) ( β + =
   (A.8)
 
  ) 1 ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( s t j s t j s t j LFP POP E − =        for  64 55 ≤ ≤ j  (A.9) 
  ) , , ( ) , , ( s t j s t j POP E =  for  65 ≥ j  (A.10) 
Total pension expenditures can then be obtained by summing up expenditures over age and 
gender categories: 
 
∑∑ =
js
s t j t PEXP TPEXP ) , , ( ) (
 (A.11) 
Relation between change in health status and labour force participation  
The change in labour force participation resulting from a change in health is given by the 
following equation: 
  [ ] 1
) , , ( ) , ( ) , , (
^
) , , ( 1 − − = s t j o s j s t j s t j P F L LFP θ ε µ
 (A.12) 
where 
                                                      
16 These expenditures include outlays on disability benefits, unemployment benefits, early retirement 
benefits and public pensions. Expenditures on public pensions comprise the largest part of these 
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With ER , DI , and OUTFLOW respectively presenting early retirement, disability inflow and the 
yearly outflow from the labour market. Equation A.13 implicitly assumes that only persons who 
make use of early retirement or disability schemes are likely to change their exit decision if their 
health improves, i.e. persons who make use of unemployment schemes will not be affected by 
any health changes.
17 The average health change that occurs in the respective year by respective 
age and gender is given by θ . The elasticity  o ε  guides the relation between the number of 
persons who exit the labour force and health status. This elasticity is the same for all age 
categories and for both genders. The respective change in labour force participation resulting 
from a change in health can then be used to correct for the number of persons eligible for 
pension expenditures at ages 55 to 64. 
Public finances: Revenues  
To calculate the impact of population ageing on government finances we have to make 
assumptions on how government revenues and expenditures are likely to develop in the future. 
Starting first with the revenue side, total government revenues TOTREV are divided into three 
categories, i.e. direct tax revenues  DTREV , indirect tax revenues  ITREV  and other revenues 
OTREV (including such items as corporate taxes, profits on land sales, seignorage and so on). 
Direct tax revenues and other revenues grow at the same rate as GDP. These revenue categories 
are closely related to the level of output. Output equals labour productivity h times the labour 
force participation LFP. Hence, direct tax revenues relate to the size of the working population, 
while indirect tax revenues are more related to the level of consumption. This corresponds better 
to the size of the whole population rather than the working population. In particular, in an aging 
economy consumption may grow faster than output, making it useful to account explicitly for 
consumption-related tax revenues. We thus have: 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t t t t LFP h dtrv GDP dtrv DTREV = =  (A.13) 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( t t t POP h itrev ITREV =  (A.14) 
  ) ( ) ( t t GDP otrev OTHREV =  (A.15) 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t t t t OTHREV ITREV DTREV TOTREV + + =  (A.16) 
Public finances: Expenditure 
On the expenditure side, total primary expenditures TOTPEXP are divided into five expenditure 
categories. These are health expenditures  HCEXP , pension expenditures TPEXP , expenditures 
                                                      
17 In some countries, persons with health problems also use unemployment schemes as an alternative exit 
route – which is for example the case in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, we assume that the majority of 
persons with health problems use the disability schemes and disregard any influence of health changes on 
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on social security benefits SSEXP , other expenditures OTHEXP (including expenditures on 
infrastructure, defence and so on) and education expenditures  EDEXP . Health expenditures 
develop according to equation A.7 with θ  equal to zero if no health improvement takes place. 
Pension expenditures develop according to equation A.12. Expenditures on social security 
benefits rise in line with economic and population growth. Other expenditures rise in line with 
economic growth. Education expenditures rise in line with economic growth and are also related 
to changes in the number of young people, i.e. those aged 5-24. We thus have: 
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Public finances: Deficit and debt 
From the development in government revenues and expenditures the development of the 
primary government deficit  pt  and the debt  B can be deducted in the usual manner. 
  t t t TOTREV TOTPEXP pt − =  (A.21) 
  t t t t pt B r B + + = −1 ) 1 (  (A.22) 
As a measure of the sustainability of public finances we use the so-called ‘sustainability gap’.
18 
This sustainability gap measures the difference between the primary surplus in the starting year 
of the projection period and the primary surplus that corresponds with sustainable public 
finances. A positive sustainability gap indicates that current fiscal policies are not sustainable 
and policies have to increase primary surpluses (or reduce primary deficits) in order to finance 
the costs of population ageing. In case of a negative sustainability gap, primary surpluses can be 
reduced (primary deficits increased) without jeopardising the sustainability of government 
finances. 
The sustainability gap can be calculated as follows: 
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where 
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18 For an overview of different indicators of the sustainability of government finances, see Jägers & 
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Here, S denotes the sustainability gap (as defined for the start of the projection period), r the 
nominal interest rate, g the nominal rate of economic growth,  0 B  the level of public debt in the 
starting year and  t pt  the primary deficit in year t. Both the debt and the primary deficit flows 
are in terms of GDP. The same holds true for the sustainability gap measure S. The second term 
in the bracket represents the present value of primary deficits to 2050 (our projection period 
starts in 2004). The third term is the equivalent for the period from 2050 onwards. The 
expression reflects our assumption that beyond 2050 the interest rate and the rate of growth of 
GDP will have stabilised at values r and g respectively. 
Total public debt, an alternative measure of fiscal sustainability, emerges from equation A.24 if 
X is taken to be equal to  0 GDP . It can easily be seen that the ranking of countries according to 
this alternative measure coincides with the ranking according to the sustainability gap measure, 
as long as interest rates and rates of GDP growth do not differ between countries.  
AGIR – Ageing, Health and Retirement in Europe 
 
AGIR is the title of a major study on the process of population ageing in Europe and its 
future economic consequences. This project was motivated by an interest in verifying 
whether people are not only living longer but also in better health. It aims at analysing 
how the economic impact of population ageing could vary when not only demographic 
factors, but also health developments are taken into consideration. The project started in 
January 2002 for a period of three years.  
The principal objectives of the study are to:  
•  document developments in the health of the elderly, ideally since 1950, based on 
a systematic collection of existing national data on the health and morbidity of 
different cohorts of the population; 
•  analyse retirement decisions and the demand for health care as a function of age, 
health and the utility of work and leisure; 
•  combine these results, and on that basis to elaborate scenarios for the future 
evolution of expenditure on health care and pensions; and 
•  analyse the potential macroeconomic consequences of different measures aiming 
at improving the sustainability of the European pension systems.  
The AGIR project is carried out by a consortium of nine European research institutes, 
most of which are members of ENEPRI: 
•  CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies), Brussels 
•  CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales), Paris 
•  CPB (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis), The Hague 
•  DIW (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), Berlin  
•  ETLA (the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy), Helsinki 
•  FEDEA (Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada), Madrid 
•  FPB (Belgian Federal Planning Bureau), Brussels 
•  NIESR (National Institute for Economic and Social Research), London 
•  LEGOS (Laboratoire d’Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé,  
Université de Paris-Dauphine), Paris 
It has received finance from the European Commission, under the Quality of Life 
Programme of the 5
th EU Research Framework Programme. The project is coordinated 
by Jorgen Mortensen, Associate Senior Research Fellow at CEPS. For further information, 
contact him at: jorgen.mortensen@ceps.be. 
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